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Презентация на тему Securitization and credit crises

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Credit risk transfer instrumentsLoan SalesSecuritizationCredit DerivativesTraditional Distress debt Sovereign debt Pass – through securities (CLN)Collateralized Debt ObligationsMortgage – Backed Securities Synthetic structured products
SECURITIZATION AND CREDIT CRISIS 2007FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MANAGEMENTSaunders, A., Chapter 27Hull, J., Chapter 8 Credit risk transfer instrumentsLoan SalesSecuritizationCredit DerivativesTraditional Distress debt Sovereign debt Pass – AGENDA:SECURITIZATIONThe Pass -Through Security (PTS)Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO)Mortgage-Backed Bonds (MBBs)CREDIT CRISIS 2007What happenedKey mistakesKey lessons I. SECURITIZATIONSecuritization is a process of packaging and selling of loans and The Pass-Through SecurityGovernment National Mortgage Association (GNMA)Sponsors MBS programs and acts as Major Benefits of Securitisation: lower cost of funding due to the enhanced Incentives and Mechanics of  Pass-Through Security CreationExample: Assume that Bank has Mechanics of  Pass-Through Security CreationBank pays annual insurance premium to the GNMA Pass-Through process: Creation of the Asset backed security (ABS)Mortgage credit insuranceBankMortgages2. Calculation of a constant monthly payment of borrowers:  Size of the Payment scheduleFully amortized mortgages: GNMA Pass-Through processThe bank aggregates the payments for mortgages and passes funds Further IncentivesThe attractiveness of these bonds to investors. In particular, investors in Effects of prepaymentsPrepayment risk is the risk that the loan will be Asset Backed Security (continued) The WaterfallEquity Tranche1st loss2nd loss, if 1st loss is more than 5%3d Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (ABS CMO) were created to manage  the prepayment Collateralized Mortgage  Obligation (CMO)Prepayment effects differ across tranches (classes)R ClassImproves marketability Mortgage-Backed  Bonds (MBBs)Normally remain on the balance sheet.No direct link between Mortgage-Backed  Bonds (MBBs)EXAMPLE: Before securitization Problems: Da > Dl, high risk Mortgage-Backed  Bonds (MBBs)Weaknesses:Tied up mortgages on the balance sheet for a Securitization of other assets CARDsVarious receivables, loans, junk bonds, ARMs.Can all assets be securitized? U.S. Real Estate Prices, 1987 to 2009: S&P/Case-Shiller Composite-10 IndexCredit Crisis 2007 What happened…Relaxation of Mortgage standardsStarting in 2000, mortgage originators in the US What happened...Mortgages were packaged in financial products and sold to investors:The most Key Mistakes Made By the MarketRatings to tranches was not assigned relative Key Mistakes Made By the MarketRegulators required to retain only from 5% Lessons learned:Ensure transparency of complex products. Creators of the products should provide Lessons learned:More emphasis on stress testingMore emphasis on stress testing and managerial Major Reasons of the Financial Crisis  in KazakhstanFinancing of the high Why Financial Crisis in Kazakhstan was not so severe as in developed Real Estate Price Dynamic in Kazakhstan Structural changes in Kazakhstani banking industry since 2008. Concentration ratios of top five Kazakhstani banks Source: www.afn.kz Market share of local bank vs market share of banks with foreign Kazakhstan Banks’ Nationalization
Слайды презентации

Слайд 2 Credit risk transfer instruments
Loan Sales
Securitization
Credit Derivatives
Traditional
Distress debt

Credit risk transfer instrumentsLoan SalesSecuritizationCredit DerivativesTraditional Distress debt Sovereign debt Pass


Sovereign debt
Pass – through securities (CLN)
Collateralized Debt Obligations
Mortgage

– Backed Securities

Synthetic structured products


Слайд 3 AGENDA:
SECURITIZATION
The Pass -Through Security (PTS)
Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO)
Mortgage-Backed

AGENDA:SECURITIZATIONThe Pass -Through Security (PTS)Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO)Mortgage-Backed Bonds (MBBs)CREDIT CRISIS 2007What happenedKey mistakesKey lessons

Bonds (MBBs)
CREDIT CRISIS 2007
What happened
Key mistakes
Key lessons




Слайд 4 I. SECURITIZATION
Securitization is a process of packaging and

I. SECURITIZATIONSecuritization is a process of packaging and selling of loans

selling of loans and other assets backed by securities.
Forms

of asset securitization:
Pass-through securities (PTS);
Collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO)
Mortgages-backed securities (MBS);


Слайд 5 The Pass-Through Security
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA)
Sponsors MBS

The Pass-Through SecurityGovernment National Mortgage Association (GNMA)Sponsors MBS programs and acts

programs and acts as a guarantor.
Timing insurance.
FNMA actually creates

MBSs by purchasing packages of mortgage loans.
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Similar function to FNMA except major role has involved savings banks.
Stockholder owned with line of credit from the Treasury.
Sponsors conventional loan pools as well as FHA/VA mortgage pools.


Слайд 6 Major Benefits of Securitisation:
lower cost of funding due

Major Benefits of Securitisation: lower cost of funding due to the

to the enhanced rating stemming from mixed of senior

and junior securities issued.
capital saving from the sale of assets – decreases the minimum earnings required to ensure an adequate return to shareholders
important source of fee income
Investors enjoy the higher return from the mortgage market


Слайд 7 Incentives and Mechanics of Pass-Through Security Creation
Example: Assume

Incentives and Mechanics of Pass-Through Security CreationExample: Assume that Bank has

that Bank has 1000 new residential mortgages with the

average size of each = $100 000, maturity 30 years, mortgage coupon 12% p/a
The total size of new mortgage pool is $100mill=1000*100 000
Capital adequacy requirements (risk weight is 35%) =100*0.08*0.35=$2.8mill
Minimum reserve requirements 10 % of deposits:
Assets Liabilities
Cash = 0.1 * D Deposits (D) = x
Mortgages = 100 Equity = 2.8
0.1D+100 = 2.8+D
Therefore, D=108 mill.

Asset Liabilities
Cash = 10.8 Deposits = 108
Mortgages = 100 Capital = 2.8
Total = 110.8 Total = 110.8

Слайд 8 Mechanics of Pass-Through Security Creation
Bank pays annual insurance

Mechanics of Pass-Through Security CreationBank pays annual insurance premium to the

premium to the FDIC. Assume the deposit insurance premium

of 27 bps.
Premium = $108 x 0.0027 = $0.2916
It is treated as non interest expense and recorded in the Income statement.
3 levels of regulatory taxes:
Capital requirements;
Reserve requirements;
Deposit insurance premium.
Additional exposures:
Gap exposure or Da > kDl .
Liquidity exposure.

Слайд 9 GNMA Pass-Through process: Creation of the Asset backed security

GNMA Pass-Through process: Creation of the Asset backed security (ABS)Mortgage credit

(ABS)
Mortgage credit
insurance
Bank
Mortgages
2. SPV
Mortgages are
placed on balance
sheet
3.

GNMA
Bond created

4. Outside
investors

GNMA timing
insurance of cash
flow to
bondholders

5. Sale proceeds
For GNMA bonds

Fee 6bp

Fee 44bp

Coupon 12%

Coupon 11.5%

Household

12%


Слайд 10 Calculation of a constant monthly payment of borrowers:

Calculation of a constant monthly payment of borrowers: Size of the


Size of the pool: PV = $100 000 000

(1000 x $100 000)
Maturity: n =30 years
Number of monthly payments per year: m =12
Annual mortgage coupon rate: r = 12%
PMT = constant monthly payment to pay off the mortgages over its life

PMT = $100 mill / {1 - 1/(1+r/m) mn}
r/m

PMT = $100 mill / {1 - 1/(1+0.12/12) 360} = $1,028,613
0.12/12
$1,028.61 per mortgage for 1000 mortgages

Слайд 11 Payment schedule
Fully amortized mortgages:


Payment scheduleFully amortized mortgages:

Слайд 12 GNMA Pass-Through process
The bank aggregates the payments for

GNMA Pass-Through processThe bank aggregates the payments for mortgages and passes

mortgages and passes funds through to GNMA the bond

investors via trustee net servicing fee and insurance fee deductions.
As a result the coupon rate on bonds will be set at approximately 0.5% below the coupon rate on the underlying mortgages.
Mortgage coupon rate = 12%
Servicing fee = - 0.44%
Government insurance fee = - 0.06%
Pass through bonds = 11.5%
Therefore, if a life insurance company bought 25% of GNMA bond issue it would get 25% share of the 360 promised monthly payments from the mortgage pool.

Слайд 13 Further Incentives
The attractiveness of these bonds to investors.

Further IncentivesThe attractiveness of these bonds to investors. In particular, investors

In particular, investors in these bonds are protected against

2 levels of default risk:
1. Default risk of the borrowers.
If the prices on houses fall rapidly, a homeowner can leave the low-valued mortgage. This might expose the mortgage bondholders to loses unless there are external guarantors.
2. Default risk of Bank/ SPV
Even if the bank or trustee bankrupt, GNMA would bear the costs of making the promised payments in full and on time to GNMA bondholders (due to GNMA insurance).
Assumed LGD = 25%



Слайд 14 Effects of prepayments
Prepayment risk is the risk that

Effects of prepaymentsPrepayment risk is the risk that the loan will

the loan will be paid off before the contracted

maturity.
Sources of risk:
Mortgage refinancing due to decrease in interest rates
Housing Turnover
Good news effects
Lower market yields increase present value of cash flows.
Principal received sooner.
Bad news effects
Fewer interest payments in total.
Reinvestment at lower rates.

Слайд 15 Asset Backed Security (continued)

Asset Backed Security (continued)

Слайд 16 The Waterfall
Equity Tranche
1st loss
2nd loss, if 1st loss

The WaterfallEquity Tranche1st loss2nd loss, if 1st loss is more than

is more than 5%
3d loss, if 2nd loss is

more than 20%

Слайд 17 Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (ABS CMO) were created to

Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (ABS CMO) were created to manage the prepayment

manage the prepayment risk
Assets
Senior Tranche (80%)
AAA
Mezzanine Tranche (15%)
BBB
Equity Tranche

(5%)
Not Rated

Senior Tranche (65%)
AAA

Mezzanine Tranche (25%) BBB

Equity Tranche (10%)

The mezzanine tranche is repackaged with other mezzanine tranches


Слайд 18 Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO)
Prepayment effects differ across tranches

Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO)Prepayment effects differ across tranches (classes)R ClassImproves marketability

(classes)










R Class
Improves marketability of the bonds

Mezzanine
Tranche
A
B
C
Mezzanine
Tranche
B
C
$2.5 mill
P

= $1 500 000
C = $291 667

$1208333

C = $ 333 333

C= $375 000

P=500 000
C = $ 333 333

C = $375 000


Слайд 19 Mortgage-Backed Bonds (MBBs)
Normally remain on the balance sheet.
No

Mortgage-Backed Bonds (MBBs)Normally remain on the balance sheet.No direct link between

direct link between the cash flows on the underlying

mortgages and the interest and principal payments on the MBB.
Issued to reduce the risk to the MBB bond holders:
Segregation the group of mortgages on the balance sheet;
Pledging this group as collateral against the MBB issue.

Слайд 20 Mortgage-Backed Bonds (MBBs)
EXAMPLE: Before securitization

Problems: Da >

Mortgage-Backed Bonds (MBBs)EXAMPLE: Before securitization Problems: Da > Dl, high risk

Dl, high risk premium paid to uninsured depositors.



Слайд 21 Mortgage-Backed Bonds (MBBs)
Weaknesses:
Tied up mortgages on the balance

Mortgage-Backed Bonds (MBBs)Weaknesses:Tied up mortgages on the balance sheet for a

sheet for a long time;
Increases the illiquidity of the

asset portfolio;
Over-collateralization;
Liability for capital adequacy and reserve requirement taxes.

Слайд 22 Securitization of other assets
CARDs
Various receivables, loans, junk bonds,

Securitization of other assets CARDsVarious receivables, loans, junk bonds, ARMs.Can all assets be securitized?

ARMs.
Can all assets be securitized?


Слайд 23 U.S. Real Estate Prices, 1987 to 2009: S&P/Case-Shiller

U.S. Real Estate Prices, 1987 to 2009: S&P/Case-Shiller Composite-10 IndexCredit Crisis 2007

Composite-10 Index
Credit Crisis 2007


Слайд 24 What happened…
Relaxation of Mortgage standards
Starting in 2000, mortgage

What happened…Relaxation of Mortgage standardsStarting in 2000, mortgage originators in the

originators in the US relaxed their lending standards and

created large numbers of subprime first mortgages.
Very low interest rates,
Increased demand for real estate ? boost in mortgage prices ? real estate speculation
Further relaxation of lending standards
Mortgage lenders and brokers wanted to keep their profit and knew that loans would be sold.
Features of the market: teaser rates, NINJAs, liar loans

Слайд 25 What happened...
Mortgages were packaged in financial products and

What happened...Mortgages were packaged in financial products and sold to investors:The

sold to investors:
The most important thing for the lenders

was whether the mortgage could be sold to others.
Banks found it profitable to invest in the AAA rated tranches
Their promised return was significantly higher than the cost of funds and capital requirements were low
In 2007 the bubble burst.
Some borrowers could not afford their payments when the teaser rates ended.
U.S. real estate prices fell and products, created from the mortgages, that were previously thought to be safe began to be viewed as risky

Слайд 26 Key Mistakes Made By the Market
Ratings to tranches

Key Mistakes Made By the MarketRatings to tranches was not assigned

was not assigned relative to the risk:
Rating agencies had

lack of experience in rating structured products and used relatively little historical data.
Mispricing of securitization tranches:
Assumption that a BBB tranche is like a BBB bond. In reality, BBB tranches were much more risky and incurred losses 100 % instead of assumed 25%.
Default correlation was not taken into account when assessing the credit risk:
Default correlation goes up in stressed market conditions.


Слайд 27 Key Mistakes Made By the Market
Regulators required to

Key Mistakes Made By the MarketRegulators required to retain only from

retain only from 5% to 10% of tranche by

the originator when the credit risk is transferred
Crisis showed that it was not enough to control the risk appetite of originators.
Regulators and investors did not understand the overall risk of FIs:
Over-the-counter derivatives’ positions were hidden off the balance sheet


Слайд 28 Lessons learned:
Ensure transparency of complex products.
Creators of

Lessons learned:Ensure transparency of complex products. Creators of the products should

the products should provide a way for potential purchasers

to assess the risks (e.g., by providing software)
Over-the-counter derivatives should be:
Daily marked to market;
Put on the balance sheet
FIs need to create models to assess the risks
Most financial institutions did not have models to value the tranches they traded. Without a valuation model risk management is virtually impossible




Слайд 29 Lessons learned:
More emphasis on stress testing
More emphasis on

Lessons learned:More emphasis on stress testingMore emphasis on stress testing and

stress testing and managerial judgement; less on the mechanistic

application of VaR models (particularly when times are good)
Senior management must be involved in the development of stress test scenarios


Слайд 30 Major Reasons of the Financial Crisis in Kazakhstan
Financing

Major Reasons of the Financial Crisis in KazakhstanFinancing of the high

of the high credit growth through external borrowings;
Given up

liquidity for profitability;
Limited investment opportunities:
Risky investments
Low diversification across different sectors:
High concentration risk
Overvalued real estate prices in 2006-2007;
Fall in collateral value increases loans’ LGD
Slow reaction of AFN to changes and underestimation of major risks:
Regulatory oversight


Слайд 31 Why Financial Crisis in Kazakhstan was not so

Why Financial Crisis in Kazakhstan was not so severe as in

severe as in developed countries?
Proportion of foreign banks was

relatively low.
63% of all market belonged to the 4 largest KZ banks
Amount of mortgages for securitization was still not high enough to practice active securitization.



Слайд 32 Real Estate Price Dynamic in Kazakhstan

Real Estate Price Dynamic in Kazakhstan

Слайд 33 Structural changes in Kazakhstani banking industry since 2008.

Structural changes in Kazakhstani banking industry since 2008.

Слайд 34 Concentration ratios of top five Kazakhstani banks
Source:

Concentration ratios of top five Kazakhstani banks Source: www.afn.kz

www.afn.kz


Слайд 35 Market share of local bank vs market share

Market share of local bank vs market share of banks with

of banks with foreign ownership
Source: www.afn.kz
All data as

of January 1 of the given year.




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